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Talking Points for the DCI

I. Status of the South African Military Incursion into Angola

The six week long South African military operation into southern Angola ended in late August.

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As the result of this operation, South Africa probably has expanded its zone of control in southern Angola which may now extend further to the north and to the west. (see map)

We still cannot confirm the report that Cuba began airlifting 2,500 combat veterans to Angola in late August in response to the South African operation.

II. Status of the Cuban Withdrawal Issue

According to the Department of State, both the Angolans and the South Africans have accepted "in principle" a "procedural framework" whereby some Cuban troops would remain in Angola until Namibian independence and all South African troops would leave Namibia some months earlier after the election for a constitutional assembly.

Despite progress in bringing both parties along on this issue, there remain several pitfalls to securing an agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal.

- The Angolan agreement in principle, given by President dos Santos to Deputy Assistant Secretary Wisner in late August, does not necessarily represent the views of the majority of the MPLA leadership. Moreover, the related issue of UNITA has not yet been resolved. Luanda fears a UNITA military advance once the Cubans are withdrawn.
- We have seen no new evidence to indicate the Cubans or the Soviets--who retain substantial leverage in Angola--will be willing to cooperate with such a plan.

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- We are surprised at the South African agreement to the proposal that the Cubans do not have to be out until independence. South Africa will demand a firm and verifiable commitment of a Cuban withdrawal.
- Both sides will seek to avoid blame should the Namibia talks break down over this issue.
- Tanzania and Zambian suggestions that Cubans be replaced by French or other forces (at a 4 September Frontline summit) were firmly rejected by Angola.

III. UNITA

A major Angolan-Cuban offensive evidently was launched late last month against UNITA-controlled southeastern Angola.

- UNITA leader Savimbi says that his forces lost some ground, including two towns, in the early stages of the offensive, but they have since regained some positions.
- South African officials do not seem particularly alarmed by the Angolan-Cuban activity and see no immediate threat to UNITA.

Nonetheless, the current offensive seems to be part of a more intensive Angolan-Cuban effort in the southeast in comparison with previous operations there.

- The number of Angolan and Cuban troops at the main garrison in this region is three times what it was a year ago.
- Supply lines to the region have been improved and secured in recent months.

UNITA, for its part, continues to conduct guerrilla operations throughout most of the southern two-thirds of the country.

- Operations include raids on small Angolan garrisons, ambushes of government convoys, and disruptions of the Benguela Railroad.
- The guerrillas have continued to be particularly active in west-central Angola, where their tribal supporters are concentrated.
- Although reliable information on the guerrillas' numerical strength is limited, we believe, on the basis of reporting from UNITA and press sources, that UNITA has been growing fairly

steadily and now has around 20,000 men, including some 10,000 to 15,000 full-time armed combatants and the rest "auxiliaries" in various stages of training.

IV. South Africa's Regional Policies

South Africa's policies toward its neighbors have become distinctly harsher in the past year or so.

- Rather than seeking enduring relations with compliant black neighbors, we believe South Africa now aims at keeping its neighbors weak, susceptible to South African economic leverage, preoccupied with internal problems, and incapable of challenging Pretoria militarily.


Pretoria sees the southern Africa region as containing several fundamentally troubleline forces: exile guerrilla forces linked to domestic dissidents, hostile neighboring black states either in the Soviet orbit or heading that way, and a growing presence of the Soviet Union and its allies who are manipulating the Africans for their own needs.

Pretoria actively backs insurgencies in Angola, Mozambique, and Lesotho and is heavily involved in covert actions against Zimbabwe.

- We believe that South African support for insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique probably was intended initially to counter their support for South African insurgents, but the successes of UNITA and the NRM probably have encouraged many in Pretoria to hope for the overthrow of both dos Santos and Machel.
- Pretoria's preemptive policies toward foreign-based insurgencies have been largely successful, dissuading all but Angola from substantial support of the insurgents.

By hitting various transport and other facilities in Angola and Mozambique, the insurgents also reinforce Pretoria's economic hegemony, ensuring that South Africa's landlocked neighbors to the north are unable to reduce their dependence on transportation routes through South Africa.

South Africa's tougher regional policies also reflect the growing influence of the military in Pretoria. We believe that the military's influence with Prime Minister Botha, who held the Defense portfolio for 12 years, causes security concerns to be elevated above other considerations and a distinct preference for "sticks" over "carrots" in pursuing security objectives.



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